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ABSTRACT 
This papee develops a polideal monetary madel based on partisanship and 
cornmitment arguments that explains the likely existence of expansionary 
monetary paliey in pre-election periods irrespective of tbe incumbent party and 
of pennanent partisan differences in monetary poliey. The approach taken is 
to incorporate the aption that political parties elahorate electoral economic 
programs into a tational partisan electoral model. Que results are consistent 
with the recent empírical findings of Alesina, Cahen, and Roubini (1992, 
1993) fOf a sample including three decades in 18 OECD economies but without 
relying on opportinistic governmental behavior. 
RESUMEN 
Este trabajo desarrolla un modelo político de la conducción de la política 
monetaria basado en argumentos de partidismo y compromiso vinculante que 
explica la probable existencia de políticas monetarias expansivas en periodos 
preelectorales así como la de diferencias partidistas en la conducción 
monetaria. La idea consiste en incorporar a un modelo electoral partidista y 
racional la opción de que los partidos políticos presenten al electorado un 
programa económico electora1. Las conclusiones del modelo son consistentes 
con los recientes resultados empíricos de Alesina, Cohen y Roubini (1992, 
1993) para Una muestra de 18 países de la OCDE durante tres décadas pero sin 
tener que utilizar el supuesto de comportamiento oportunista por parte de los 
gobiernos . 
• Thi! paper i1 based upun a chapter of my docI<Jral dlssertalion al !he Universidad Complu!ense de Madrid. 
Rescareh facllilles JllOvlded by CliMA are gnllcfully acknowledged. 
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1. Introduction 
Conventional wisdom suggests tbat in pre-eleetion periods governments 
bave incentives to stlmulate tbe economy by misuslng policy instruments to 
enhance their prospects of re-eleetion. In a reeent series of papers, Alesina 
and Roubln! (1992) and Alesina, Cohen. and Roubini (1992. 1993) have tested 
for evidenee of this type of opportunistic behavior in a large sample oí 18 
OECD countries. They flnd sorne evidence of politlcal monetary cycles, that is, 
expansionary monetary policy in pre-election periods and of systematic 
partisan differences in monetary pollcies. 
Apart from the manlpulative model of Nordhaus (1975), there exists a new 
generation of theoretlcal rational political business cycle models that could 
account íor sorne oí the emplrical íindings of Alesina. Cohen, and Roubini. In 
particular. building upon earlier work oí Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff 
(1990), a poli tical economy model of monetary policy has been constructed by 
Fratianni. van Hagen, and Waller (1993). In that paper, governments have the 
same utlllty function as private agents but they are also opportunlstlc. That 
ls, governments care about winning electlons and do nat have partisan 
mot!vations. Moreaver, dlfferent governments are characterized by different 
levels of competency and the government 15 more informed than the voters about 
its own level oí competency. As a consequence, the incumbent government has an 
incentive to signal its competence by engaging In pre-electoral manipulations 
oí monetary policy. 
However, it ls debatable that the emp1rical features cited aboye are 
dlrect consequences of an opportunistlc behavlor on the part of incumbent 
governments. In other words, the evidence of pre-electoral expanslonary 
monetary policy can be consistent with a non-opportunlstic behavior of 
governments in the sense that they do not care about winning elections. 
In fact. ElIls and Thoma (1993) have recently developed a ratlonal 
part!san business cycle model based on the assumption that a Hundell-Fleming 
effect exists in the economy. \Hth this assumption, the1r model 15 able to 
account for tha existence of polltical monetary cycles and d1fferences in 
money growth across part1es. 
The purpose of this paper ls to construct a poli tical monetary model 
based on partlsanshlp and commltment arguments to explaln the likely existence 
of expansionary monetary policy in pre-election periods and partisan 
diCferences in monetary policies across parties without relying on 
opportunistic governmental actions or controversial effects supposedly 
existing in the economy. 
Our approach wi11 be to combine a ralional bipart!san model w1th the 
model of policy announcements developed by Cukierman and Liviatan (1990. 
Specifically, it eenters upon the introduction of the option that the two 
competing partias alaborate an electoral economic program to be presented to 
the voters before the elections are held. 
Horeover, economic agents know each party' s objective functlon but they 
are nol able to fully determine what kind oC policymaker -dependable (who 
always llves up to his declarations) or weak (who fulfi1ls previously 
announced pIans only if such a eourse of action ls ex post efficient)- will be 
in charge of monetary policy. 
2. The Model 
Consider an eeonomy where two distinct politieal parUes (a liberal 
party, denotad by D and a conservative party, denoted by R) compete 
periodically Cor ~bntrol of the government. Each period oC time the parUes' 
~ preferences are described by the objective functions 
b > z > O (1) 
(2) 
where mt and mte are the actual and rationally expected mone9 growth rates. As 
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Cukierman (1992) pointa out. there may be several reasons Cor such an 
objective functlon: an employment motive, a revenue motive, a balance-of-
payrnents motive, and a financial stability motive. Fo!lowing the parUsan 
theory of monetary policy it is assumed that the lIberal party cares 
relatively more about surprise money growth. 
Assume further that the wlnning party directly controls monetary poliey. 
Elections take place every two periods (1, 2) and are held at the beginnlng of 
period 1. Thus, period 1 lS the post-electoral period and period 2 19 the pre-
electoral one. Ihe probability distribution of electoral outcomes is taken as 
exogenous and, like the objective functions, ls common knowledge: party D 
faces a constant probability, P, of being eIected. 
Ihe literature about the behavior of "strong" and "weak" monetary 
policymakers shows a tendency to interpret this difference on the grounds of 
their different relative preferences for monetary surprises (Vickers, 1986; 
Ayuso, 1991). However, it can be argued that the literature on partisan 
polleies considers this type oC interpretation by conceiving a conservative 
policymaker as strong and a liberal one as weak. 
Nevertheless, as in Barro (1986) and Cukierman and Liviatan (1991), there 
exists an alternative way of seeing those dlfferenees. In these papers, both 
typas oC policymaker have identical preCerences but differ In their ability to 
precommlt to the announcements they make ex ante their belng in office. 1 Rere 
we encompass both interpretatIons of the policymaker' s type by dividing the 
policymakers Crom each party (D, R) into two groups: those who always live up 
to their promises (dependable, denoted by F) and those who fulflll previously 
announced plans only if it ls ex post efflcient (weak, denoted by W). 
Deviating from an announced policy imposes a fixed cost on a polieymaker 
in each period. Such a cost can be derived from a personal reputation 
approach. Since eaeh policymaker as an individual may improve his standing in 
society by living up to their previous promises, a policymaker may encounter a 
3 
cost in terms of lower personal reputation if he reneges on previous 
announcements. Here 1 wi11 consider that a dependable policymaker incurs a 
prohibitive cost if announcements are not met and, in turn, his announcement 
is blnding. Horeover, a weak policymaker incurs no cost if previous 
announcernents are not honored and accordingly this pollcymaker ls free to 
behave according to his preferences. 
Ihe publlc does not know how large this cost is because dependabllity 
dlffers across policymakers and is private information. The distrlbution of 
policymakers by their level of dependability may reflect the general norms of 
society. The adherence lo previous announcements varies across individuals in 
a soclety (and, therefore, across pollcymakers) aud ls, at least a priori, 
informatlon prlvate to each individual. Since policymakers are drawn from the 
society in which they live there are similar individual varialions in 
dependability across pollcymakers. The general public is, at least inltially. 
not fu11y informed about the dependability of the policymaker in office for 
the same reason that the dependabilily of a randomly drawn individual is not 
known with certainty. Given existing norms each individual i5 informed a. 
priori about the distribution of the population but not abaut the 
dependabllity of particular ather individuals (Cukierman and Liviatan, 1991). 
In our electoral model I incorporate the assumption thal w1thin each 
party (D, R) the monetary policymaker may be dependable or weak. The public 
knows this feature bul at the time expectations are formed. it does not know 
which type of policymaker (F or W) the winning party wi11 put in charge of 
,1 
monetary policy. ¿~oreover, we assume that the events "party X is elected" 
" 
(K=D,R) and "party y's policymakers are dependable" (Y=D,R) are independent. 
Since the dependability of a policymaker cannot be ascertained until he 
is in off ice, his own party is uninformed about that personal characteristic 
as it is the general publico Accordingly, the winn1ng party may appofnt either 
a dependable or a weak monetary policymaker without knowi~g for sure which 
4 
'( 
type he ls. 
The probability held by the public at the beginn1ng of period t, t=1,2, 
that a liberal monetary authority is dependable ls denoted by at. Simllarly, 
0l denotes the probabllity that a conservative policymaker 15 dependable. al 
and 01 are the glven exogenously priars while a2 and O~ depend on the monetary 
policy observed in period 1. 
Each party has an oplion to elaborale an electoral economic program 
annoWlcing its stance on monetary policy (1.e .• the money growth rates for 
periods 1 and 2). 
Ir the programs are announced, the sequence of events for perlad 1 ls the 
fo11owing: 
al Pre-electoral polls are taken before the election revealing that party D 
wll1 win w1th probability P and party R w1th probabllity 1-P. 
b) 80th parties elaborate and announce their electoral programs. 
c) The public, knowing p. al' °1 , and the electoral programs form5 money 
growth expectations for period 1. 
After the election a party i5 in office. One of the two types of 
policymaker from the party elected runs monetary policy for his two perlods In 
office, bul the public does not know the type with certalnty. However, the 
flrst-period monetary palicy observed may convey to the public information 
about the type of policymaker in afflce. In choosing first-period money 
growth. a weak pollcymaker takes into account the effect of thls monetary 
stance on his second-period reputation. The sequence of events for perlod 2 
are: 
d) The public, havlng observed both the electoral result and perlod 1 policy, 
updates lts probability of the event that the policymaker ls dependable. Then, 
the public sets money growth expectations for perlod 2. 
e) Finally, the policymaker chooses periad 2 money growth. 
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3. Honetary Policy witb Electoral Programs 
Each electoral term the objective of both types of policymaker within 
each party are to maximize the present value of utility 
(3) 
(4) 
where o and '" are the liberal and conservative rates oC time preCerence, 
respectively. The analysls wUI be performed by assuming that party D ls 
elected. Ihe results can be easily extended to a party R electoral victory, 
Consider the behavior of a weak liberal policymaker (DW) in period 2. 
Since he incurs no cost for reneging on the announcement he always crea tes 
money at the discretionary rateo Ihls rate is given by maximizing uda in 
equation (1). Tbe resultlng rate is 
b (5) 
However, he may not necessarlly plck b in perlad 1 if he feels lt is 
disadvantageous to be revealed as weak by his choice of flrst-period monetary 
atance. Ihat depends on the relationship between the benefit in the first 
periad of choosing b rather than rnimicking the dependable policyrnaker and the 
cost of being revealed as weak already at the beginning of periad 2, If the 
cost is smaller than the benefit, 9uch a DW palicymaker chaoses b in period 1, 
producing a separating equilibrium. If the cost is larger than the benefit, he 
mímics the behavi~r oC the dependable liberal policymaker (DF) in period 1 
H 
" produclng a pooling equilibrium. Each type of equilibrium will arise depending 
on the values of the liberal discount factor, Ó. of the initial liberal 
reputation, «1' and oí the prabability of being elected, P. 
Ihe strategy vectors (announcement and actual monetary stance, 
respectively) of the two types of liberal pOlicymaker (DF. DW) for each period 
6 
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oce 
SDF "" {mlDa,mlDF,m-la,mlF} and 
{m1Dl/a, mtDl/, maDI/a, mll/}. 
An equilibrium in pure strategies ls a pair of strategy vectors Si 
(i=DF,DW) such that SI maximizes UD in (3) given SJ (J~i) and the public's 
expectation formation mechanism. Here lt is important to note that the 
monetary announcements for both perlads are made (and contained wi thin an 
electoral program) befare the election is held. 
3.1. Separating Equilibrium 
Suppose there exists a configuration of parameter9 (<<l'ó,P) so that a 
separating equillbrium arises. Since the pUblic know9 these parameters, it 
also knows tbat the monetary authority will reveal his type by the end of 
period 1. This implies that the weak policymaker will not mimic the dependable 
ane in the first period. Given this fact, the best choice of actual money 
growth for DW is the discretionary rate, b, and this is common knowledge. 
However, tbe identity of the monetary authority is not known by the public 
prior to the realization of mi' 
Consider now the following strategy for the DF policymaker. Al the start 
oC period 1 he announces arate of money growth miDa. Since he ls dependable 
he also delivers this rate during the period and this fact i8 known by the 
publico Hence, the expected money growth rate for periad 1 is 
(6) 
A necessary condition for maximization oí UD by DF i8 the maximization of 
utility in period 1. Substltuting (6) into (l) and noting that mtDa=mtDF , this 
problem can be rewritten as 
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I 
I 
I 
whose solutlon ls 
(8) 
The corresponding value of utility 15 
(9) 
exceeds ud t (b,Pb+(l-P)mt Re ¡ and DF prefers to make the optimal announcement, 
In the second and last perlad type DF ls known to be himself with 
certalnty when he is In orfice, because it ls known both which party was 
elected and the monetary stance in period 1, Therefore, his announcement for 
tbe second period ls fuUy helleved and m2;e=m2;°a, Hence, when tbe monetary 
authorlty ls a DF policymaker, the second-period utility function reduces to 
(10) 
This program ls maximized ror m2;°a=o provided the DF policymaker 
announces wlthin an electoral program that this is the rate of money growth to 
which he ls commltted, 
Now we examine the behavior of the DW pOllcymaker In the first period, 
Since equillbrium ls separatlng, such a policymaker knows that he will choose 
b already in the first period. But he can improve utllity by mimlcklng the 
announcement, mt O", of tbe dependable pOllcymaker at the beglnnlng of perlad 
,1 
1. Tbe reason is;qthat otherwlse flrst-period utility ls ud t (b,Pb+(1-PlmIRe J '~1 
., 
since expectatlons adjust already at the start of that perlod, However, ir 
mtDa is announced, expectatlons are given by (6) and utllity In period 1 ls 
(1) 
whlcb ls greater than ud1{b,Pb+{l-PlmtHCI ]. 
8 
The DW policymaker plcks the discreHonary rate b in the secand period 
because he no longer is able to affect expectatlons, For the same reason his 
second-period announcement has no effeet on expectations. As a consequence, In 
arder to not being revealed as weak already in period 1, such a DW policymaker 
wlll pick the same second-period announcement chasen by the dependable 
policymaker. Hence, we flnd a sole electoral program elaborated by party D. 
This program contains two monetary announcements: a first-period announcement 
and a second-perlod announcement. 
Summing up, the equilibrium strategles of the two types under separation 
are 
SSDF" = {mtOa,mt°F',mla,mlF} <: {b(1-PCXt),bO-PCXt),O,o} 
SsDH '" {mtDWa,mtOIl,m2;DWa,mlW} = {bO-rCXt),b,O,b} 
02a) 
(12b) 
A separatlng equillbrium arlses if and only lf, glven the DF 
policymaker's equilibrium strategy and expectation formatlon, DW i5 better off 
choo5ing b rather than mimicking DF and creating money at rate b(l-PCXt) In the 
first periad. Hence, if that equilibrium emerges it must provide a two-perlod 
utillty greater than the utility provided by a mimlcking strategy. Such a 
mimicking strategy ls 
(13) 
The present value of his utlllty under this strategy ls 
(14) 
If, on the other hand, DW adheres to the separating equllibrium in (12b), 
the present value of his utlllty ls 
(15) 
9 
Consequently, a separating equilibrium emerges 1f and only if UD (S .. ml) 
exceeds UD(S~OW). Fram (14) and (15) this i5 equivalent to the condltion 
(16) 
Note that lhe 5eparating equilibrium in eqs. (12) ls the only separating 
equllibrium. The reason ls that in the second period, once their types have 
been fully revealed, both policymakers always follow their most preferred 
strategies which are O and b for DF and DW, respectively. Since lhe 
equilibrium is separatlng, the best actual monetary stance for DW In perlod 1 
ls b. And glven separation, miDa ls tbe only equiUbrium strategy for DF in 
period 1. As DW is always better off announcing (mlDa ,m2Da ) than dolng 
anythlng else, both types always announce (mIOa,maDa) in the electoral 
programo 
Hence, there exisls a sale equilibrium electoral program for party O when 
the equlllbrlum is separating. Such a program ls given by eqs. (12). 
3.2. Pooling Equilibrium 
In a pooHng equilibrium there is no separation until the last move of 
the game which involves the choice of actual money growth in period 2. Henee, 
in all prevlous moves DW must mimle DF. That ls 
1,2 (17a) 
(17b) 
, 
,1 
Slnce tbe DW~olicymaker cannot cornmit to stick to the announcement, and 
• 
slnce the second perlod is the 1ast one, the DW policymaker always chooses the 
dlseretionary rate, b, in that periodo Let mIDa be the rate of money growth 
cbosen and announced by type DF in pedad 1. The public knows the '~arameters 
of tbe model and therefore the faet that equillbrium is pooHng. Hence, 
expectations are 
10 
(18a) 
mi" '" PmtOo + (l-P)m t R" '" Pmt Da + (1-PlmlRI! (1Bb) 
aam2Da + (1-aa)b = alm2Da + (1-a:l)b, if party D ls eIected (l8c) 
The second equality ln (18c) ls a consequence of the faet that (excluding 
perlod 2 money growthJ the strategies of both pollcymakers are identical, as 
shown by eqs. (17). As a result, there is no change in the probability 
distribution of policymaker' s types heId by the pUblic although both the 
electoral outeome and the first-period money stance are known. 
The DF policymaker knows that the pubIlc is aware of tbe fact that the DW 
pollcymaker will mimic his announcement and his monetary stance for periad 1. 
Henee, he knows that any announcement will be fuIly believed as specified in 
(lBa) and (18b). Slnee both types adhere to their electoral program far perlod 
1, there 15 no unexpected money growth ir party D i5 eleeted. The money growth 
rate that maximizes DF' s utility in the first periad is obtalned by using 
(18b), 
(19a) 
The solut1on ls 
b(1-P) m. OIl (19b) 
The optimal announeement elaborated by DF for the 5eeond period under a 
pooling strategy 15 obtalned by uslng (lBc): 
(20) 
The solutian is maOa = b(1-a1). To sum up, the strategies of the two 
paIicymakers under poo1ing are 
11 
SLDr "" {bU-P),bU-P),bU-at LbO-a1J} 
SLDW "" {bU-P),bO-p),b(1-a1J.b} 
and the correspondlng expectations are 
(2Ia) 
(21b) 
(21e) 
A pooHng equllibrium arises if and only if. giveo DF' s equillbrium 
strategy and expectation formation. DW la better off following the strategy 
SLDW than deviating írom it. If he follows the strategy SLDW , the present 
value of hls utility 18 
(22) 
If the DW policymaker decides to deviate from SLDW • then he chooses b 
rather than b(1-P) in period 1. HoW"ever, sloce he is better off not belog 
revealed prior to the formalion of first-periad expectations, he stlll 
announces a money growth rate equal to b(1-P), thus maiotaining first-period 
expectations at that rate. Slnce he deviates from the pool1ng equllibrlum 
strategy, the weak policymaker' s type i5 cornmon knowledge at the start of 
perlad 2. Hence. the public expects a monetary stance at rate b for period 2 
if both party D won the election and DW deviates in period 1. In summary. the 
entire strategy of the DW policymaker when he deviates from SLDW is 
SnmDW = SDwlno mlml.cklnq "" {b(1-Pl.b,bO-a1),b} 
,"/ 
.1 
and the correspond~ng expectatlons are 
.,. 
(23a) 
(23b) 
SUbstituting equations (23) into (4), the present value oí utUPy ls 
(24) 
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Hence, if and oniy if UD(SI.OII) > UD(SnniDW ), a pooHog equilibrium 
emerges, which is equivalent to the condition 
(S > p2/2a l 2 (25) 
4. Conditions íor Alternative Types oí Eqoilibrium 
Expressions (16) and (25) permit us to completely characterlze the 
condltions leadlng to alternative types oí equilibria. Thus, equilibr1um ls2 
separating if and only if 
pooling if and only if 
(S < p2al2/2 
p2/2a12 < (S 
(26a) 
(26b) 
Expression (26a) shows that the smaller al and P the smaller the range of 
!S's for which separatlng equilibrla emerge. Moreover, (26b) shows that the 
smaller al and the higher P the smaller the range of (S' s for which pooling 
equillbria arise. The intultion underlying these results is as follows: the 
smaller the reputation "1 and the electoral probability P the larger the money 
growth rate chosen by DF in period 1 when separatlon ls expected (see eq.(S». 
However. the larger this rate. the stronger the incentive of the DW 
policymaker to postpone separation to the last periodo Hence, the range of a's 
for which equillbrium ia aeparating shrinks. 
In addltion. as can be seen from eq, (22), the benefit to the DW 
policymaker of fully mimicking the DF one decreases as reputation declines and 
P rises. As a consequence, the range of 5's for which there ia pooHng also 
shrinks. rhe intuition la clear: despite following a pooHng strategy, a DW 
policymaker sti 11 can surprise the public in period 1 ir P is distlnct from 
one. The surprise will he higher the smaller p, At the same lime m26 
'" b(1-aI2), as (21c) shows. Thus, the surprise DW can oblain in period 2 ls 
lower the smaller al' 
rf we assume thal on average the electoral probab1lit1es of lIberal and 
conservative parties are similar (P ~ 0.5), then figure 1 fully characterlzes 
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the type of equilibria tbat -on average- arise for alternatlve combinations of 
«-1 and o5. The flgure suggests that if we put a diffuse prior on tbe pair of 
parameters (1;1 and 0, pooHng equilibrla are Hkely to emerge but it wlll be 
difflcult to see separating equillbrla. In fact, the condition for a 
separating equilibrium is virtually unachievable unless policymakers dlscount 
the second perlod almost entirely, slnce it requires that a be at most 0.125. 
{INSERT FIGURE 1J 
5. The Equilibrium Honetary Paliey of Party R 
Separatlng, poollng and mixed equilibrla for party R are derived 
slmilarly to party D's case, In particular, ir the cornmon objective of 
conservative policymakers ls to maximize (5) then the results obtained above 
can be dlrectly extended to party R's case, This i5 so by substltuting R for 
D, j\ for 0, (l-P) for P, and 01 for "1' 
6. Time Paths for Honey Growth 
Expression {12a} shows that ir equilibrlum i5 separating and the 
pol1cymaker is dependable money growth wlll be lower in perlad 2, Ir the 
policymaker is weak. money growth does not change across perlods as shown by 
(12b). On average, if equillbrium ls separating we will observe decreaslng 
money growth in pre-election periods (perlad 2), However, as stressed above, 
the likelihood of observing separatlng équilibria is very small. 
Expression (2ia) shows that ir equllibrlum is poollng and the policymaker 
_:1 ls dependable mo:oey growth will be hlgher In perlod 2 if P > Ut. Moreover, 
~{ 
(21b) shows that~lf the policymaker 15 weak, money growth 15 always higher 
In perlod 2. As a consequence, on average, if equil1brium 15 poaHng maney 
growth wlll be higher In pre-election periads. 
Overall, slnce separating equillbria are scant and poollns\ equilibrla 
provide Qn average higher pre-electoral money growth, our ~odel genera tes the 
,; 
predictíon that money growth will tend to be higher befare elections and lower 
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7. Partisan Paths for Honey Growth 
In general, ir we assume that the liberal and conservativa rates of time 
preference are similar and that tha dependability does nol diffar across 
parties, then tha differences thal cDuld exisl belween liberal and 
conservative money growth rales wl11 depend upon the difference (b-z). Since 
by assumptlon this dlfference 15 positive, our model predicts that Qll average 
money growth rates wl11 be hlgher under liberal admlnlslralions. 
B. Conclusions 
This paper develops a politlcal monetary modal based on partisanship and 
commilment arguments that explains lhe likely exislence of expansionary 
monetary pol1cy in pre-electlon periods irrespective oC the incumbent party 
and of permanent partlsan differences in money growth. The approach taken is 
to incorporate the option that political partles elaborate electoral economlc 
programs into a raHonal partlsan electoral model. Ihe key feature In thls 
work ls the imperfect information the pUblic has about a policymaker's abillty 
to stand behlnd his announcement when in office. This contrasts with Alesina 
(1988) who emphasizes the difference between previous announcements and 
~ctually implemented polic1es in the framework of an electoral play wlth 
ratlona!, forward-looking and fully informed voters. In that paper voters are 
ful1y informed about the partles' objectlve funcUons and thus wi11 not 
, 
belleve any preel~ctoral announcements other than the ones which exactly match 
'0 <, 
those genuine preferences. In our framework, on the contrary, the exlstence of 
uncertainty about pollcymakers' type can induce the announcement of only 
partlally credible electoral programs. 
" The obtalned results are broadly consistent with the empirica!l findings 
of Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini for a sample that includes tpree decades in 18 
OECD economies. At the same time, they do not rely on either an opportunistlc 
15 
governmental behavior or disputable effects supposedly existing in the 
economy. 
16 
Footnotes 
(1) Backus and Driffi11 (1985) are somewhat 1ess explicit about the source of 
the differences hetween strong and weak pollcymakers; these authors consider a 
strong policymaker as one who never inflates. Ihis may he due to his not being 
coneerned aboul monetary surprises or to his being irrevoeably committed to a 
zero money growth rate. 
(2) It can be shown that the DW policymaker may have a time consistent mixed 
strategy constructed from the two pure strategies and an appropriately 
defined mixing probability. The condillon for this strategy to emerge is 
p2«12/2 < 5 < p2/2«12. However, for this case to be interesting it needs to be 
demonstrated that the mixed strategy is preferred by the weak pOllcymaker to 
either of the pure strategies. Slnce such a demonstratlon ls very cumbersome 
from an analitical vlewpoint because it will depend upon four parameters (<<t. 
5, b, and P). our analysis will be restricted to the two pure strategies. 
17 
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